WASHINGTON, DC - Today during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, U.S. Senator Jack Reed (D-RI), a senior member of the committee, discussed President Obama's strategy in Afghanistan with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen. The transcript follows:

REED: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Madam Secretary, Mr. Secretary, Chairman.

There's been much made about this withdrawal goal as arbitrary. But let me ask you, Admiral Mullen, this was based on the advice of General McChrystal and your advice about your expectation of the -- what the situation on the ground would be in 2011 given these additional resources and change of policy, is that correct?

MULLEN: We -- we -- I have a very clear view, and I think so does Generals Petraeus and McChrystal, that by mid-2011 we will know whether we are going to succeed here or not. That has -- that has been something that we've discussed and we agreed on. That's why getting these forces in so quickly is so important to try to reverse this thing.

And it's -- and some of it is based on the fact the Marines have been in Helmand this year, so in fact the Marines will be in one of the toughest places for three fighting seasons, if you will, '09, '10 and '11. And we think with the additional forces we will have very strong indicators about how this is going and -- and our ability to transfer and transition at that point.

REED: So you wouldn't describe the date as arbitrary?

MULLEN: No, sir. It -- it -- it wasn't arbitrary. That said, what the president also said is it would be responsible and it would be based on conditions. And it's -- you know, all of us can look out and think, you know, speculate what those conditions will be. But I think we have to be careful about that. But that is the goal right now.

GATES: I would just clarify, if I could, Senator?

REED: Mr. Secretary?

GATES: The -- the July 2011 date was chosen because it will be two years after the Marines arrived in Helmand.

REED: And giving them the fighting opportunities, for want of a better term that -- fighting obligations or fighting challenges that...

REED: The issue of the deadline also raises the issue of our posture in Iraq. There is a deadline there, Mr. Secretary, and that is a legal deadline -- which I understand couldn't be changed without the permission of the Iraqis, even if conditions deteriorated. Is that correct?

GATES: That's correct. The -- all of our combat forces are to be out by the end of August 2010, and all forces out by the end of 2011.

We do have some flexibility in terms of the pacing of the withdrawals between now and the end of August, but even with the hiccups over the elections the problems with respect to the election law, at this point General Odierno does not see any need to alter the pacing of the drawdowns in Iraq.

REED: There is -- that is -- that was a great do by the Bush Administration, is a hard deadline without conditions. Is that correct?

GATES: That is correct.

REED: One of the other aspects of this was the process of deliberation that went into it. It took time, but from your comments this morning that time, I sense, was well spent. In one aspect of this I think, Admiral Mullen, was the original plan by General McChrystal would not have had the flow of forces as quickly as the final plan adopted by the president is that correct.

GATES: And in particular with respect to the NATO forces that again they're not committed yet, that we would hope to certainly making it -- we're hopeful that they will be available more quickly and that we will do everything we can to get as much capability in as quickly as possible, but I don't want to overstate that.

REED: Right.

GATES: It is accelerated to some degree but I don't want to
overstate that, but it really gets him the forces he needs this year
to turn this thing around.

MULLEN: And I would add that the final component of his original request, the final Brigade combat team would not have arrived in Afghanistan until the summer of 2011.

My own personal recommendation was there's no need to commit to that since it's so far in the future. And so to Admiral Mullen's point earlier, fundamentally General McChrystal is getting more troops faster than under the original plan.

REED: And under the -- all right let me just rephrase that. This process as you've suggested has produced in your minds a better proposal across the board than originally was submitted by the individual components, the Ambassador, General McChrystal, et cetera, et cetera.

GATES: I'm convinced everybody in the process feels that way because one of things that clearly -- one of the concerns that I had coming out of the March decisions was that they were interpreted very broadly as -- and in the press and elsewhere, as a commitment to full scale nation building and creating a strong central government in Kabul.

And broad understandable skepticism over such broad objectives and it sounded very open ended, so one of the principal components of the dialogue over the last three months is how do we refine and narrow the mission to make it achievable and achieve the objectives in terms of our own security.

REED: Mr. Secretary, some of the criticism of even talking about a date regardless of whether it's a hard unconditional withdrawal as in Iraq or proposal of the president is that it would embolden the enemy on one hand, or on the other hand they would lie low and wait us out.

It strikes me is that the Taliban has been emboldened quite aggressively over the last several years without any type of deadline and if they sit it out what will you do if they simply gave up the operational space to us for 18 months or two years.

GATES: Well we certainly would welcome them not being active for the next 18 months because it would give us open field running with our allies and the Afghans to build capacity.

I think as you make the point, we are already in a situation in which they are embolden and in which they are being aggressive and where they have the momentum right now and so it's not clear to me what more they could do then they're doing right now.

The forces that we're sending in are intended, in the first instance, as the Admiral has said, is to reverse that momentum and deny them the ability to control territory.

REED: Thank you.