OPENING STATEMENT OF U.S. SENATOR JACK REED

RANKING MEMBER, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

 

SD-G50

DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING

Tuesday, November 10, 2015

 

To receive testimony on 30 years of Goldwater-Nichols reform

(As Prepared for Delivery)

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.  I’d like to join you in thanking our distinguished panel of witnesses for their willingness to appear today to provide their perspectives on the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, what has changed since enactment of that watershed legislation, and any additional reforms that should be considered as we look to the future.

We are fortunate to have with us today two former staffers of this Committee who played key roles in the development of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and then went on to serve in the Department in the years after its passage.  I think it’s safe to say that no one was more central to these efforts than Mr. James (Jim) Locher who served as the Committee’s lead staffer for DOD reorganization and later as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.  Dr. John Hamre also made notable contributions to the crafting of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and later served as the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Comptroller during the 1990s.  Your work on the Goldwater-Nichols reforms and oversight of their implementation was a significant achievement and stands as a testament to the important work done by this Committee.  I also want to recognize Mr. Jim Thomas, who is an expert in defense strategy and planning having served in a variety of roles over the course of a 13-year career at DOD and studying these issues as the current Vice President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

Almost three decades after passage of Goldwater-Nichols, I think it is appropriate that we take stock of what is and is not working with regard to the organization and processes of the DOD, given today’s dynamic security challenges. 

The 1986 defense reforms were made necessary by of a number of identified deficiencies at the time, including operational failures, poor interservice coordination, faulty acquisition processes, and inadequate strategic guidance.  Fortunately, our military has not experienced any significant operational failures in recent times and remains the most effective fighting force in the world – in no small part because of the reforms put in place approximately 30 years ago. 

Unfortunately, DOD does continue to suffer from bureaucratic friction, acquisition cost and schedule overruns, and difficulties in the formulation and communication of strategy.  Our task at this juncture is to optimize the Department’s organization and processes and to shape our military to counter the threats and other challenges they will face in the future, while preserving the important principles of “jointness” and civilian control of the military enshrined in the Goldwater-Nichols reforms.

To do so, we should consider smart reforms to: the structure and responsibilities of our combatant commands; the alignment of roles and missions across the military services; the manner in which civilian control of the military is exercised; the size and number of defense agencies and field activities; the development and acquisition of required capabilities; the education and compensation of military personnel; and other relevant matters.

The 1985 Staff Report of this Committee that underpinned the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and was authored by Mr. Locher and Dr. Hamre, highlighted challenges and risks in seeking to reform the Department of Defense.  It said “The Department of Defense is clearly the largest and most complex organization in the Free World.  For this reason, it is critically important that if changes are to be made to DOD organizational arrangements or decision-making procedures, the temptation to adopt simplistic, yet attractive, options must be avoided.  Change just for the sake of change would be a critical mistake.”  Those words remain true today and I would note that possibly the most important factor in passing the Goldwater-Nichols Act was the relentless bipartisan effort of its sponsors over the course of nearly five years to methodically study relevant issues and build consensus for reform, even in the face of strong opposition from the Department. 

I thank the Chairman for his leadership and our witnesses for their impactful work on these issues.  I have no doubt your collective experiences and testimony will make a meaningful contribution to the Committee’s efforts going forward.